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Technical Report 65-5

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Advisor and Counterpart Activities
in the Military Assistance Program
in the Republic of China

by

Dean K. Froehlich and Malcolm S. Klores

HumRRO Division No. 7 (Language and Area Training)

June 1965

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Prepared for:

Office, Chief of
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Contract DA 44-188 ARO-2

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The George Washington University
HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH OFFICE
operating under contract with
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

CRD/J

SUBJECT: Advisor and Counterpart Activities in the Military Assistance Program in the Republic of China

TO:


1. This report concerns a survey made in the Republic of China to determine how certain aspects of the Military Assistance Program are perceived by American advisors and by their Chinese counterparts. The survey was conducted as part of an Exploratory Study to obtain information on human factors training problems in the program.

2. The survey covered such topics as background characteristics and work patterns, sources of information that led to attempts to introduce changes, kinds of problems that arise, obstacles to solution of problems, and degree of satisfaction with progress. The answers of American advisors and of their Chinese counterparts are summarized and compared in the present report.

3. The results of the survey suggest a need for further information on factors that (a) would tend to increase contacts between advisors and counterparts during off-duty periods, (b) would assist the advisor in differentiating MAP problems that are readily solvable from those that are not, and (c) would increase the use of counterparts as sources of information on problems.

FOR THE CHIEF OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT:

1 Incl
Report


HERALD B. GALLINGER
Colonel, GS
Chief, Human Factors and
Operations Research Division

Advisor and Counterpart Activities in the Military Assistance Program in the Republic of China

by

Dean K. Froehlich and Malcolm S. Klores

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Prepared for:

Office, Chief of Research and Development,
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HumRRO Division No. 7 (Language and Area Training)
Alexandria, Virginia

The George Washington University
HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH OFFICE
operating under contract with
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Technical Report 65-5
Exploratory Study 2:
Military Assistance
Program

The Human Resources Research Office is a nongovernmental agency of The George Washington University, operating under contract with the Department of the Army (DA 44-188-ARO-2). HumRRO's mission, outlined in AR 70-8, is to conduct research in the fields of training, motivation, and leadership.

The findings in this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position, unless so designated by other authorized documents.

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FOREWORD

The research described in this report was part of an Exploratory Study (ES-2) conducted by the Human Resources Research Office on human factors training problems existing in the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Research along these lines is now being continued in HumRRO's Task MAP, Development of Guidelines for Training Personnel for Military Assistance Advisory Duties, which was established after the Exploratory Study had indicated the desirability and feasibility of further research directed toward these objectives.

The research was initiated by the Training Methods Division in 1962, with Dr. Arthur J. Hoehn serving as the Director of Research of the Division. Task MAP was transferred to the Language and Area Training Division (now HumRRO Division No. 7) when that research unit was established in 1963, with Dr. Hoehn as Director of Research. Dr. George H. Brown was the Exploratory Study leader during the planning stages, and Dr. Dean K. Froehlich was the Study leader for the remainder of the project.

HumRRO research efforts are conducted under Army Contract DA 44-188-ARO-2, with this Exploratory Study performed under Army Project No. 2J024701A712 01, training, motivation, and leadership research.

MEREDITH P. CRAWFORD
Director
Human Resources Research Office

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Problem

The importance of effective interaction between American military advisors and their foreign counterparts to the success of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) led to the establishment of an Exploratory Study; to obtain information on human factors training problems in the program.

During this Study, a survey was made in a country (the Republic of China) in which the Military Assistance Program is operating, to determine how various aspects of MAP work are perceived by the American advisors and by their Chinese counterparts. Data were obtained from both groups on such topics as sources of information that led to attempts by advisors or counterparts to introduce changes, the kinds of problems that arise, obstacles to solution of these problems, and degree of satisfaction with progress being made.

Research Procedure

A questionnaire making generous use of open-ended free-response type questions was selected as the most effective method of getting information on a wide range of problems from a large personnel sample. Every third name from a list of advisors in the Military Assistance Advisory Group was designated to receive questionnaire materials. Two packets (one sealed) were sent to each of the 115 advisors thus sampled, with instructions to forward the sealed envelope of materials to the counterpart with whom he worked most closely.

The counterparts received an official directive instructing them to complete the questionnaires and return them directly to the senior researcher. The counterparts' questionnaires were in their native language, and the answers were translated into English for analysis by the research staff.

Completed questionnaires were returned by 77 advisors and 77 counterparts (67% of each group).

Findings

Characteristics of Advisors and Counterparts

(1) On the average, Chinese counterparts were older, held higher rank, and had more experience with the Military Assistance Program than their American advisors. (p. 7 and Table 1)

(2) Counterparts had had considerably more interaction with members of non-Chinese cultures than American advisors had had with non-American cultures. (p. 7)

(3) Advisors reported having little social ("off-the-job") contact with Chinese civilians. (p. 6)

The Advisors

(1) Advisors, on the average, estimated that they spent about two-thirds of their time on advisory matters and most of the remainder on administrative matters. (p. 7)

(2) Advisors reported that the more important problems they encountered were most often in the areas of Command Responsibility, Maintenance, and Supply. For advisors of the rank of major and above, the principal problem area was Command Responsibility; for captains and below, the main problems were in Maintenance and Supply. (pp. 9-10 and Table 2)

(3) Advisors reported that they had worked on their unsolved problems over a much longer period, on the average, than they had worked on the problems they classed as solved. (pp. 10-11 and Tables 3 and 4)

(4) Advisors reported that the most frequent obstacles to the solution of problems were in the categories of Value Differences, Command Responsibility, and Supply. Value Difference obstacles appeared to persist over a longer percentage of the advisor's tour of duty than any other class of obstacles. (pp. 11-12 and Tables 5 and 6)

(5) More advisors were satisfied than dissatisfied with the progress they were making. There were no sizable differences in degree of satisfaction with progress as a function of the degree of importance advisors attached to the problems. Even on problems rated as unsolved, advisors in general did not report being dissatisfied with their progress. (p. 13 and Table 7)

(6) Approximately three-fourths of the advisors expressed favorable attitudes toward the counterparts with whom they had worked, and most of the remaining responses were neutral. (pp. 13-14 and Table 8)

(7) Advisors reported that the source of information that was most important, and that most often led to identifying problems and undertaking action, was personal observation. (pp. 14-16 and Table 9)

The Counterparts

(1) Counterparts, on the average, estimated that they spent about 10% of their time on meeting with their MAAG advisors, half of their time on administrative duties, and the remainder in training troops and other responsibilities. (p. 7)

(2) Most counterparts reported that participation in MAP had influenced them to attempt changes, that most of these changes were completely or mostly accomplished, and that they have been able to increase the effectiveness and the responsibilities of their subordinates. (pp. 18-20 and Tables 11 and 12)

(3) As reported by counterparts, lack of equipment and lack of supplies accounted for the most important and most frequently mentioned obstacles to solution of problems. (p. 19 and Table 10)

(4) About 15% more Chinese expressed positive attitudes toward their American advisors than the latter did toward the former. In addition, Chinese counterparts expressed slightly greater satisfaction with their progress in solving problems than the American advisors did with theirs. (p. 21 and Tables 13 and 14)

(5) The Chinese counterparts were influenced to work on specific problems mainly by suggestions from their advisors and suggestions from their superior officers. (p. 22 and Table 15)

Channels of Communication

(1) Almost all of the superiors of the counterparts had American advisors. Less than half of the advisors normally had opportunities to communicate directly with the

superiors of the counterparts they advised. About half of the counterparts indicated that no advisor was assigned to their subordinates. (pp. 22-24)

Conclusions

(1) Since counterparts spend a smaller proportion of their time than advisors do on duties directly connected with the Military Assistance Program, it is possible the counterparts' other activities and responsibilities affect their views of the MAP activities.

(2) The greater time period involved in the problems rated as unsolved implies that there may be important differences between the nature of the problems that were solved and those that were not. (Factors contributing to these differences have not been identified in the present study.)

(3) On the basis of impressions obtained from the survey responses of counterparts, it appears that the counterparts are interested primarily in materiel rather than advice. They appear to think of the advisors more or less as middlemen and instructors in the use of the equipment being supplied. From the Chinese point of view, their major problems and obstacles stem from the fact that U.S. policy as regards Taiwan emphasizes defense and the United States is not willing to provide the great increases in funds and equipment that Nationalist China forces feel they would need for a return to the mainland.

(4) Whereas advisors indicated that differences between their values and those of their counterparts constituted the most frequently encountered obstacle, counterparts feel that lack of equipment and supplies is the most serious obstacle to solution of problems.

(5) The factors that led Chinese counterparts to work on specific problems are different from those that influence American advisors. The counterparts were influenced to work on specific problems by their advisors more often and more strongly than advisors were influenced in this respect by their counterparts. Counterparts also relied more heavily on suggestions from their superior officers. Compared to their advisors, counterparts were less often and less strongly led to work on specific problems by personal observations—the most important source of information for the advisors—or by taking over the problem from a man transferred elsewhere.

(6) Advisors must rely heavily upon their own superiors and their Chinese counterparts for both upward and downward communication within the Chinese Army. The interpolation of his counterpart or his own superior between the advisor and his counterpart's superior may lead to attenuation in precision of MAP advice and coordination within the Chinese Army.

(7) The results of the present study suggest the desirability of further exploration on:

(a) Factors that would tend to increase leisure contacts between advisors and indigenous military and civilian personnel.

(b) Factors differentiating Military Assistance Program problems that are readily solved from those that are not.

(c) How to increase the use American advisors make of their Chinese counterparts as sources of information to identify specific problems to be attacked.

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**Advisor and Counterpart Activities
in the Military Assistance Program
in the Republic of China**

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PROBLEM

The success of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) depends to a large extent on effective interaction between American military advisors and their foreign counterparts. The advisor encourages efficient and effective practices in the foreign military organization to which he is assigned and attempts to induce changes that he believes will assist this effort. However, changes are often not easily accomplished. The advisor needs the full support and assistance of his counterpart because, in the final analysis, the foreign nationals determine how effective their military organizations will be.

To assess feasibility of research on human factors training problems existing in the Military Assistance Program, an Exploratory Study was conducted by the Human Resources Research Office.¹ During this Study a survey was conducted in a country (the Republic of China) participating in the Military Assistance Program, to obtain information on the work of both the American advisors and their Chinese counterparts. The survey dealt with such topics as the kinds of problems that arise, obstacles to the solution of the problems, sources of information that lead to action, and satisfaction with progress as perceived by both the advisors and the counterparts.

Although what was found in this study in the Republic of China might not be typical of experience or viewpoints in other countries, the results of the survey indicate factors worthy of exploration in the other nations in which American advisors are attempting to induce changes in the indigenous military organization.

METHOD

A questionnaire was chosen as the most effective method of covering the wide range of material relevant to the survey, especially for the sizable sample of personnel desirable in exploratory work. Since little previous work has been done in this area, it was considered advisable to make generous use of open-ended free-response type questions. It was hoped that this would minimize the likelihood of excluding relevant information.

¹The Exploratory Study led to the establishment of Task MAP, Development of Guidelines for Training Personnel for Military Assistance Advisory Duties, which is now being conducted by HumRRO Division No. 7 (Language and Area Training).

Sample

In order to obtain information that was representative of advisors and counterparts in the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) being studied, only personnel designated "advisors" (as opposed to administrators) in the Table of Distribution were included in the population sampled. From a list of names of all such personnel, every third name was selected for the advisor portion of the sample for the study.

Each advisor was asked to select, from the Chinese counterparts with whom he worked, the individual with whom he worked most closely. The Chinese military personnel so selected made up the counterpart portion of the sample for the study.

Questionnaires were distributed to the 115 advisors and, through them, to the 115 counterparts in September 1962. Completed questionnaires were returned by 77 of the advisors and 77 of their counterparts (67% of each group).

The only information obtained on nonrespondents was their names, addresses, telephone numbers, and ranks. It was found that they did not differ from respondents with regard to median rank or range of ranks, nor did they appear to be concentrated in certain positions or groups within the MAAG.

Questionnaire

Method of Distribution. Each of the 115 advisors selected was sent a packet of questionnaires for his own use and another sealed packet with instructions signed by the Chief, Army Section of Military Assistance Advisory Group, to forward the sealed envelopes to "the counterpart with whom you have worked most closely." Modes of distribution of questionnaires to counterparts included the Army Message Distribution Center and personal contact with the counterpart.

Counterpart personnel selected by advisors to receive questionnaires were sent an official directive, signed by the Commander in Chief of the host Army, instructing them to complete the questionnaires and return them directly, by postage-prepaid envelopes, to the senior researcher. Respondents were assured in writing and by the distribution procedures used that there would be no way in which members of their own government, any of its agencies, or members of the U.S. Army could identify an individual with his responses.

Composition. The questionnaire sent to the advisors was in four parts (see Appendix A). Part A dealt with personal information and prior experience with the MAAG. In Part B the advisor was asked about the five most important problems on which he had worked, advice he had given concerning the problems, the obstacles to solution of the problems, the work that remained to be done, and his feeling about progress made. He was also asked how he found out about the problems, and for information about the counterpart with whom he worked on the problems. Parts C and D were concerned with informal advice given or contacts made with the Chinese, and with the frequency of nonduty social contacts with Chinese personnel.

The Chinese counterparts received a similar questionnaire in their own language. An English version translated from the Chinese is included as Appendix B. The counterparts' responses were translated into English by translators employed by the research staff. In Part I of the questionnaire the counterpart was asked for personal information and his contacts with the MAAG. In Part II he was asked about consequences of his having participated in the MAAG, changes he had made as a result of his experience and the reasons for not having been able to make some changes, and the effect of advisors on his subordinates. In Part III the counterpart was asked to describe the most important problems with which he was concerned, the advice he received, the obstacles that confronted him, his attempts to surmount them, and his feelings about progress made. He was also asked where he got his information on the problems, and what his reaction was to his advisor.

Analysis

Content Coding for Problems and Obstacles

A content coding system was developed to permit analyses of the open-ended responses to the groups of questions concerning problems and obstacles to the solution of the problems¹ (see Appendix A, Part B and Appendix B, Part III for the text of these questions). In addition to reducing responses to numerical codes, this classification system may be considered an initial attempt to define the significant elements that confront advisors in one MAP-supported country.

It should be noted that the content coding system was not an a priori framework but was rather a result of the present study and was done in order to organize the raw data into manageable units.

Classification. The initial operation in the formation of the classification system consisted of reading each respondent's answers and paraphrasing the essentials of the problem he described in succinct, synoptic statements on cards. Where similarity of content occurred, categories were established and the rules for inclusion under them formally stated. As categories emerged, it became possible to place each of them under one of 12 classes.

Each respondent's original description of problems and of obstacles to solutions of the problems was then reread and each item was coded according to the system. When any respondent's answer included reference to more than one previously developed category, only the one that the respondent regarded as the most important was recorded. Thus each respondent was represented only once in the results.

Definitions. The definitions of the 12 classes, together with several responses selected as examples of how actual responses were coded, appear as Appendix C. The names and summarized descriptions used to code comments both for problems and for obstacles are:

- (1) Maintenance and Repair—improper maintenance or repair of equipment.

¹The system was developed by Dr. Dean K. Froehlich and Miss Marguerite Bloxom. The actual coding of these particular responses was done by Miss Bloxom.

- (2) Operation and Use of Equipment—ineffective, inefficient, or potentially hazardous use of equipment.
- (3) Supply—unnecessary imbalance or absence of supplies; faulty record keeping.
- (4) Training—inadequate training methods.
- (5) Between Countries Agreements—improper or impossible requests; improper programming procedures; agreement violations.
- (6) Communication Coordination—improper or inadequate communication; excessive coordination.
- (7) Command Responsibility—inadequate or nonexistent command policies, procedures, or directives.
- (8) MAAG—nonexistent policy means and objectives; lack of necessary knowledge and skills.
- (9) Differences in What Is Valued—different standards.
- (10) Language—inability to communicate.
- (11) Do Not Know—uncodable.
- (12) Weather Conditions—unpreventable, climatic problems.

Reliability. An independent coder performed a check of the reliability of the content coding system by a blind recoding of the "problems" and "obstacles" responses of 25 randomly selected American advisors and 25 randomly selected Chinese counterparts. The advisors enumerated 82 problems and 76 obstacles; the counterparts discussed 102 problems and 54 obstacles.

Analysis of the results indicated that interrater reliability of the content coding system was reasonably good. On both problem coding and obstacle coding for the American advisors, there was 85% agreement between the original coding and the later independent coding. For the Chinese counterparts, the agreement was 88% on the coding of problems and 74% on the coding of obstacles.

While the reliability of the content coding for answers obtained from counterparts was acceptable, few of the Chinese counterparts responded to this portion of the questionnaire in a manner that would permit placing their answers in the content coding categories. Many of their answers were not directly relevant to the questions asked. To make maximum use of the Chinese responses on the questions dealing with problems and obstacles, the authors reported results on the basis of examining the written responses rather than using the formal analysis of content coding used to report advisor responses to these questions.

General Analysis

Because of the gross nature of the exploratory data, the analyses are primarily simple summary statistics such as medians, frequencies, and percentages.

Seventy-two advisors returned fully completed questionnaires; five more returned questionnaires without responses to Part B (problems, obstacles, etc.). The number of responses on which results are based varies throughout because many of the respondents did not answer all items.

RESULTS

Characteristics of Advisors and Counterparts

Age, Rank, and Experience. On Taiwan, the counterparts exceeded the advisors in age, rank, and amount of experience with the Military Assistance Program. Table 1 shows that the median age of advisors was approximately 3 1/2 years less than that of those to whom they rendered advice. Similarly, the median rank of advisors was approximately two to three ranks lower than the median of counterparts. Moreover, the median counterpart had been an active participant in the Military Assistance Program to his country about three times longer than the median advisor—48 months vs. 15.5 months.

Table 1
Comparison of Characteristics
of Advisors and Counterparts

Characteristics	Advisors (N = 72)		Counterparts (N = 77)	
	Median	Range	Median	Range
Age	38.5	25-55	42	25-64
Rank	Capt.	Col. - E-5	Col.	Lt. Gen.- 1st Lt.
Months in MAP on Taiwan	16	1-51	48	1-204

Although counterpart personnel remained in MAP positions longer than advisors typically did, they appeared to devote a smaller percentage of their duty time to MAP matters. Because of the different context (i.e., advisory vs. operational) in which advisors and counterparts work, time estimates are not directly comparable. For the 77 advisors, the median estimate of time devoted to various types of activities was: advisory, 67%; administrative, 22.5%; other, 7.5%. For the 77 counterparts, median time estimates were: meeting with MAAG advisors, 10%; administrative, 50%; training troops, 22.5%; other, 15%. For counterparts, some additional MAP-related work is undoubtedly intermixed with administrative and training activities.

Advisors and counterparts were compared with respect to amount of experience relevant to the MAP. Only 9% of the advisors had had previous MAAG experience, but 30% had had similar experience, and 1% had had both. However, 60% of the advisors reported having had no prior experience of any kind that involved interactions with members of a culture different from their own for the purpose of rendering advice. On the other hand, 13% of the counterparts reported not having had one or more American advisors previously; the median number of past advisors was seven.

Advisors had had a longer exposure to the foreign (co-worker's) culture than had counterparts. Advisors had been in the host country a median of 15.5 months, although much of that time was not spent in an

advisory capacity. On the other hand, of the 54.5% of the counterparts who had attended school in the United States, half were here for less than 6.5 months (the range was one month to four years).

Social Interactions. In order to estimate the amount of leisure time contact that occurred between advisors and Chinese personnel, both military and civilian, advisors were requested to answer the following questions:

During the last month:	<u>Median Number</u>	
	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>
How many invitations did you receive from indigenous civilians or military personnel to be their guest at a social function?	2	0
How many invitations did you accept?	2	0
How many people do you estimate that you had conversations with at these functions?	15	0
How many members of the host Armed Forces, their families and friends have been your guests at social functions?	0	0

Do you engage in any more-or-less-regularly scheduled social or recreational activities with one or more members of the host military forces, their families and friends?	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
	(N = 32)	(N = 42)

If Yes, how often do these contacts usually occur?	<u>Percent</u>
Daily	3.0
Weekly	6.1
Bimonthly	30.3
Once a month or less	57.6

These data indicated that advisors had little leisure time contact with indigenous military personnel. Although comparable information concerning the frequency of social contacts that advisors had with other Americans is not available, informal observations indicated that advisors generally interacted with more Americans under a greater variety of conditions than they did with indigenous personnel.

Although 90% of the advisors employed indigenous civilian personnel as household employees, peer social interactions between advisors and indigenous civilians were quite limited.

The Advisors

All advisors to whom questionnaires were distributed were requested to describe briefly, in order of estimated importance, five problems to

which they had devoted time (see Appendix A, Part B). They were asked to answer the following:

- (1) Briefly describe the situation as it existed before you gave any advice or made recommendations. If equipment was involved, describe it with official nomenclature.
- (2) Tell exactly what you did about this problem, i.e., explain what actions you took or what advice you gave.
- (3) What obstacles have made the problem more difficult to solve or slowed down progress on the problem? If cultural differences are involved, be sure to give a specific description of them.
- (4) How did you attempt to get around these obstacles or to remove them?
- (5) Has the problem been solved? If not solved, what remains to be done?

Problems

Occurrence of Each Problem. The comparative frequency with which the various categories of problem conditions were reported by advisors is shown in Table 2. Approximately three-fourths (76%) of all problems reported occurred in three classes: Command Responsibility

Table 2
Occurrence of Classes of Problems
Reported by Advisors
(Percent)

Class of Problem	Problem*					Rank of Advisor Reporting		All Responses
	1 (N=67)	2 (N=54)	3 (N=45)	4 (N=36)	5 (N=29)	Capt. and Below	Major and Above	
Maintenance	28	20	20	30	20	34	13	24
Supply	12	33	17	16	24	25	14	20
Training	9	4	5	6	7	5	7	6
Between Countries								
Agreements	6	2	5	6	14	2	10	6
Use of Equipment	5	4	2	8	0	5	3	4
Value Differences	5	4	2	3	7	9	0	4
Communication	3	0	5	0	0	2	1	2
MAAG	0	0	0	3	0	1	0	1
Uncodable	0	0	0	3	7	1	2	1
Language	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Weather	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Command Responsibility								
Personnel Organization	10	11	11	3	0	3	14	8
Equipment Policies	10	13	13	17	7	8	16	12
Enforcement	5	5	7	0	0	3	5	4
Training	7	4	13	5	14	2	15	8
Total - Command	32	33	44	25	21	16	50	32

*1 is problem judged most important by respondent, 2 is problem judged 2nd most important, etc.

(32%), Maintenance (24%), and Supply (20%). The remaining 24% of problems are distributed among seven different classes.

The Command Responsibility class of problems, on which 50% of all majors and colonels included in this study reported having spent time, is the class that advisors believed could be solved by (1) instituting new policies, regulations, or procedures of wide applicability, or (2) modifying policies, regulations, and procedures that advisors judge to be inadequate or ineffective, or to result in inefficiency.

It can be observed from Table 2 that for captains and below the principal problems were in the Maintenance and Supply classes, whereas for majors and above the principal class of problems was Command Responsibility.

Time Periods Involved. Of the total number of problems reported by the advisors, roughly one-third were classed as solved and the remainder considered unsolved. Examination of the median length of time during which advisors were concerned with unsolved, as compared to solved, problems indicates that while some problems are solved relatively quickly, many others remain unsolved even after a considerably longer time has elapsed. More specifically, approximately one-third of the problems appear to have been solved after they had received attention during a period amounting to about 20% of the advisor's tour of duty, whereas about two-thirds of the problems remained unsolved even after the advisor had given attention to them during 60% of his tour of duty (see Table 3).

Table 3
Comparison of Time Periods For Solved and Unsolved Problems^a

Importance of Problem	Percent of Problems Solved	Solved Problems			Unsolved Problems		
		N ^b	Median Period (months)	Proportion of Assignment Period (Percent)	N	Median Period (months)	Proportion of Assignment Period (Percent)
1	32	22	2.0	20.0	44	7.5	60.0
2	33	18	2.0	12.5	34	11.5	73.5
3	38	17	3.0	21.4	25	8.8	65.7
4	34	12	3.0	34.5	21	10.0	60.8
5	28	7	0.8	6.3	19	6.5	45.8
Total		76			143		
Average	35		2.9	18.8		8.8	61.5

^aThe portion of his assignment during which advisor was concerned with the problem.

^bN's given are for median period data, the N for the total (percent of problems solved) is slightly larger and the N for the proportion of assignment period is slightly smaller.

It should be noted that these results held for all five problems (most important, second most important, etc.) with no consistent differences of consequence among them.

Examination of time periods by class of problem (Table 4) indicates that, of all three major classes, the greatest difference appears to exist between the median percentages of time required by solved and unsolved Maintenance problems. In other words, unsolved Maintenance problems appear to have persisted over much longer time periods than

Table 4
Proportion of Assignment During Which Advisor
Was Concerned With Solved and
Unsolved Problems of Selected Classes^a
(Median)

Class of Problem	Solved		Unsolved	
	Percent	N ^b	Percent	N
Maintenance (includes use of tools and facilities and specific items classes)	12.5	13	93.3	35
Command Responsibility	13.6	34	63.6	35
Supply (includes record keeping)	42.9	15	55.4	30

^a Based on estimates by advisors.

^b Number of cases reported by all respondents for all problems.

had Maintenance problems that had been solved—about eight times as long. Work periods reflecting unsolved Command Responsibility problems were about five times the length of the periods shown for solved ones. In Supply, time periods reported for solved and unsolved problems did not differ greatly.

Obstacles

Respondents to the questionnaire were asked what factors, if any, they saw as retarding the final solution to the problems reported. In order to quantify the answers to these open-ended questions, the coding system was used to obtain a classification of obstacles.

Occurrence of Each Obstacle. As Table 5 indicates, about three-fourths (74%) of all obstacles reported by advisors can be placed in one of three classes: Value Differences (38%), Command Responsibility (20%), and Supply (16%). The remaining 26% of obstacles reported are distributed among six classes. Statements defining Value Differences, the single class that accounts for the largest number of obstacles, indicate that "... counterpart and advisor differ with respect to what is considered valuable and important, and what standards of excellence should be expected."

Time Periods Involved. An analysis parallel to that described for the period of time devoted to each problem was carried out on the obstacle classes. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 6.

Value Difference obstacles appear to persist over a longer percentage of the advisor's time than any other class of obstacles that was reported and coded. Of the 30 cases that fell into this class of obstacles, only 8 are associated with solved problems. The remaining 22 cases are estimated to have influenced advisors during approximately 88% (median estimate) of the assignment period during which the advisor could have been concerned with such an obstacle. Here again, large differences are obtained between median percentages of time over

Table 5
Occurrence of Classes of Obstacles Reported by Advisors
(Percent)

Class of Obstacle	Problem					Rank of Advisor Reporting		All Responses
	1 (N=64)	2 (N=47)	3 (N=40)	4 (N=28)	5 (N=26)	Capt. and Below	Major and Above	
Value Differences	39	30	33	53	38	33	44	38
Supply	16	21	13	11	19	16	16	16
Language	11	9	10	11	8	16	2	10
Communication	4	9	2	0	4	6	3	4
MAAG	6	0	5	0	0	2	4	3
Between Countries								
Agreements	3	2	2	0	4	3	2	2
Weather	2	4	2	0	0	3	1	2
Maintenance	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	*
Use of Equipment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Training	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Uncodable	3	4	8	7	4	5	4	5
Command Responsibility								
Personnel Organization	6	6	12	10	8	8	8	8
Equipment Policies	2	6	5	0	4	2	5	4
Enforcement	6	9	5	4	8	5	7	6
Training	0	0	3	4	3	1	3	2
Total - Command	14	21	25	18	23	16	23	20

* Less than 1%.

Table 6
Proportion of Assignment During Which Advisor
Was Concerned With Solved and Unsolved Problems,
by Obstacles Associated With the Problem^a

Class of Obstacle	Solved		Unsolved	
	Percent	N ^b	Percent	N
Value Differences	43.3	8	88.0	22
Command Responsibility	14.7	10	58.6	26
Supply (includes record keeping)	20.9	10	36.6	20

^a Based on estimates of problem period made by advisors.

^b Number of cases reported by all respondents for all problems.

which obstacles lasted, depending upon whether the obstacle was associated with a solved or unsolved problem. Apparently, the length of time required for resolution of obstacles to the solution of problems was greatly influenced by some factor or factors not identified in the present study.

Advisors reported that, during the course of their attempts to solve problems they met with their counterparts, on the average, between "once every two or three days" and "about once a month."

depending upon the importance of the problem. Problems that advisors described as being among the top three in importance led them to meet with their counterparts approximately "once every two or three days," whereas problems that were ranked fourth or fifth in importance led them to meet with counterparts approximately "... once a month."

Satisfaction With Progress

For each problem that an advisor described, he was asked to express his degree of satisfaction with the progress he had made by endorsing one statement, from among six alternatives, that best described his feelings. Table 7 indicates that more advisors were satisfied than dissatisfied with the progress of their work. It also indicates that there were no significant differences in degree of satisfaction as a function of the degree of importance advisors attached to the problems.

Table 7

Degree of Advisors' Satisfaction with Progress of Their Work (Percent)

Rating	Problems				
	1 (N=69)	2 (N=56)	3 (N=46)	4 (N=37)	5 (N=29)
Extremely Satisfied	19	9	13	16	14
Very Satisfied	28	34	35	22	31
Moderately Satisfied	38	29	33	38	28
Moderately Dissatisfied	3	12	6	0	17
Very Dissatisfied	9	9	6	14	7
Extremely Dissatisfied	4	7	6	11	3
Total "Satisfied" Responses	84	71	80	76	72
Total "Dissatisfied" Responses	16	29	20	24	28

Even on the unsolved problems on which they were currently working, advisors did not appear to be dissatisfied with the progress they were making. A comparison of the "satisfaction" ratings 150 advisors assigned to five problems produces a median rating of 3.8 for unsolved problems and 2.6 for solved problems.¹

Satisfaction With Counterparts

Data on attitudes of advisors toward counterpart co-workers are summarized in Table 8. Each advisor was instructed to select the one statement from among the five alternatives that best described his feelings about the co-worker with whom he had worked most closely on each problem for which he had provided information.

Approximately three-fourths of the advisors expresses positive attitudes toward their counterpart co-workers regardless of the

¹A rating of 1 means extremely satisfied; 2, very satisfied; 3, moderately satisfied; 4, moderately dissatisfied; 5, very dissatisfied; and 6, extremely dissatisfied.

Table 8
Advisors' Attitudes Toward Counterpart Co-Workers
(Percent)

Statement	Co-Worker for Problem				
	1 (N = 64)	2 (N = 53)	3 (N = 44)	4 (N = 37)	5 (N = 28)
I would do whatever I could to arrange to be able to work with him in the future.	45	43	50	54	50
I would be moderately disappointed if we were unable to continue to work together.	34	26	20	22	32
I would have neither positive nor negative feelings if we were not able to continue to work together.	17	24	23	22	18
I would be moderately relieved if I knew that I would not work with him in the future.	3	6	4	0	0
I would do whatever I could to arrange it so that I would not have to work with him in the future.	0	0	2	3	0
Percentage Positive	80	70	70	75	82
Percentage Neutral	17	24	23	22	18
Percentage Negative	3	6	7	3	0

problem, while most of the remaining responses were neutral. There were few expressions of negative attitudes.

Sources of Information Leading to Action

An attempt was made to discover the conditions that led advisors to devote time and attention to the problems they did. Advisors were asked to rank eight alternatives, including the advisor's own statement of what the most important source of information had been (Appendix A, Part B). In Table 9 are listed (1) the mean rank assigned to each of the eight alternatives by advisors and (2) the percentage of advisors who ranked each alternative (advisors ranked only the alternatives they considered relevant).

Inspection of Table 9 reveals that over 80% of the advisors questioned regard their personal observations of situations as relevant to the discovery of problems. Furthermore, except for the ranking given the "Other source"¹ category which few advisors used, personal observations were regarded as the most important source of

¹The other sources mentioned were (1) written documents (e.g., reports that had been issued by the Government Accounting Office, reports from other military services, newspaper accounts of situations) and (2) oral communiques originating from Americans in general briefings, informal discussions, and unofficial request to examine particular situations. None of the other sources explicitly or implicitly included counterpart personnel as important sources of information leading to work on problems.

Table 9
Sources of Information Related to Advisors' Decisions to Work on Problems

	Most Important Problem (N = 69)		2nd Most Important Problem (N = 56)		3rd Most Important Problem (N = 46)		4th Most Important Problem (N = 37)		5th Most Important Problem (N = 29)		Average	
	Percent	Mean Rank	Percent	Mean Rank	Percent	Mean Rank	Percent	Mean Rank	Percent	Mean Rank	Percent	Mean Rank
1. A counterpart brought it to my attention.	28	2.68	31	3.18	33	2.80	30	3.18	31	3.00	30.4	3.0
2. My superior officer brought it to my attention.	39	2.41	29	3.19	30	2.21	30	2.18	34	2.70	32.9	2.6
3. I learned about it by reading an official report.	39	2.52	30	2.53	26	2.67	30	2.55	28	2.38	31.6	2.5
4. I learned about it from a liaison officer.	19	4.00	14	4.12	9	5.50	8	4.00	10	5.00	13.0	4.4
5. A subordinate officer brought it to my attention.	20	4.36	23	2.92	26	3.42	19	2.57	28	2.38	22.7	3.3
6. I learned of the problem from personal observation of the situation.	84	1.64	93	1.53	87	1.60	78	1.46	83	1.50	85.6	1.5
7. It was a problem that I took over from another man who was transferred elsewhere.	33	3.61	26	2.57	33	2.80	31	2.18	34	3.00	31.2	2.9
8. Other source	10	2.00	5	1.33	6	1.00	11	1.75	3	1.00	07.3	1.5

information concerning problems. Counterparts, as sources of information leading to advisors' decisions to work on problems, were generally ranked about third in importance by those advisors who consider them as relevant sources. Moreover, only about one-third of the respondents indicated that counterparts had been sources of information relevant to the decision to take action on problems. It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that counterparts are perceived by advisors as considerably less important sources of information leading to action than are their own observations.

Some Comments by Advisors

Below are some comments made by individual advisors concerning various types of obstacles they encountered.

Attitudes toward superiors and subordinates in Chinese Army

. . . the reluctance of staff officers in the Chinese Army to accept responsibility, and their reluctance to delegate authority. This, I believe, is rooted in the basic Chinese concept of reverence toward elders, and that the "father" should not be questioned, but obeyed. Also a fear of losing face if an error is made.

Chinese have been brought up to do what head of family tells them, so they wait for someone to tell them.

Habit of Chinese to procrastinate at every opportunity and reluctance of high ranking officers to make a mistake. They are afraid to act because it might not be correct.

My counterpart can't turn around unless higher headquarters tells him so. He is capable of making a sound and just decision if they let him do so. . . . I have seen all ranks of Chinese enlisted men stand up and argue with their noncoms and officers and never nothing [sic] done about it. . . . My liaison officer has told me that if the officers and NCO's are too tough with their men they just quit or even disappear for a few days. If their men don't show up on the job usually any answer will suffice as to their whereabouts.

Lower elements of the Chinese Army are extremely reluctant to make recommendations to their higher headquarters.

Higher headquarters stated that the position was safe. Junior officers would not take the responsibility and declare the position unsafe.

Conducting an honest inspection during field trips . . . I feel that my counterparts have a fear of hurting another man's feelings—this is very good in its place but can be overdone.

General policy of Chinese Army (including Chinese "values")

Previous "commitments in principle" given by U.S. advisors, apparently in haste and without a profound understanding of the problem; reluctance of the Chinese to "back up" from what they believe is already "promised."

The individualistic attitude inherent in all Chinese units. All units try to be separate in all things.

It is a one way street. In my year's experience, the G4 [counterpart] has yet to come to me with a *real* problem *requesting* advice and assistance on *his* proposed solution. They come for additional equipment, MAP funds, etc., but never on a problem which is capable of solution at Field Army level.

First of all, the Chinese are not idealist [sic] nor do they have inventive minds. They wouldn't dare make or start to make a contraption never heard of before which could also save many man-hours of work. They would be laughed at and lose face. But they will copy anything that already works. So, to start with, our advice was useless until the projects were started by us and when they finally saw that they would work, we would drop them and they would finish them, thus giving them all the honors for a job well done. (Whenever you advise you must show them that it will work.)

Supply and salvage

The Government of the Republic of China maintains a much larger armed force than we support with our MAP and this is done to a great extent with the excess and salvage material.

The United States Position—Give up something to get something better . . .

Chinese Army Position—Don't give up anything. Delay and the United States will give in.

The Chinese Army is jealous of support given by MAAG to the Chinese Air Force. Chinese Army has conception that nothing but the latest technique and equipment are adequate.

This hoarding had been going on for so long that whenever they ran out of a specific item in their "goodie box" they did have a long wait for the item. This is primarily why they were reluctant to turn in any excess.

Maintenance

Attitude of organizations was that if the equipment would function, no matter how inefficiently, the item should be kept in service.

. . . the local attitude is that as long as the equipment *can be* used, even though not 100% effective, don't worry about maintenance.

Proper maintenance techniques, and use of translated TMs, have been emphasized, but still the personnel tend to "shoot in the dark." Possibly it's a loss of face to refer to a TM.

Different goals of Chinese Army and United States Army

. . . extremely complicated, political problem mixed in with basic conflict of conflicting missions—mainland conquest vs. defense of Taiwan.

Training

Most of the officers are trained to do one job and one job only until they are promoted to Captain.

Organization

Obstacle--The apparent Chinese Army belief that the more chiefs there are, the better the organization.

Language

. . . they use the language barrier for an alibi for their mistakes.

The Counterparts

General Impressions of Problems and Obstacles

Many questionnaire responses by the Chinese counterparts did not lend themselves to placement in the content coding categories used

in this study. Therefore, discussion of problems and obstacles is based on examination of counterparts' written responses rather than a more formal analysis.

In general, many of the problems stated by the Chinese appear to arise from a difference in national goals. The American objective is primarily to strengthen the defenses of Taiwan while the Chinese Army goals seem to be directed to a return to the mainland. The major problem as seen by the counterparts is that the Americans do not supply them with enough modern equipment; what is supplied, they feel, is too little and too late.

It appears that the American advisors' advice often is not followed if it is not accompanied with equipment—especially if the advice is to "make do" with the old equipment. It is possible that the Chinese have mixed feelings about improving maintenance procedures because good maintenance might mean longer retention of old equipment. A frequent Chinese statement is that maintenance is difficult because of the scarcity of spare parts and proper lubricants. One Chinese respondent said:

Some American advisors always say that the military assistance money is paid by the taxpayers of the U.S.A. and the taxes are very heavy in that country, and if you don't do this (MAAG plan) we will cut military assistance. Those are the words of provocation and will not produce good consequences. . . . Furthermore, some advisors consider the military assistance as a bestowal in charity and not for common interest. That is a big mistake. Fortunately, advisors of this kind are few.

This respondent also commented, as did other Chinese counterparts fairly frequently:

MAAG has allowed the assistance plan without consulting the Chinese Army authorities.

One of the obstacles was clearly stated by another Chinese respondent:

The Chinese Army has stuck to the inherent virtue of China that even a small thing should not be thrown away because it may have some value for use later. The philosophy of the Chinese people is that not everything is produced easily and should not be thrown away . . . Because of the reasons mentioned above, the old, outdated equipment and materials have been piled up too much and the space (required) for storage has been too big.

In sum, the Chinese counterparts appear to view the major problems and obstacles as stemming from the essentially defensive U.S. policy with respect to Taiwan, which precludes great increases in funds and military equipment. It appears that the Chinese regard the advisors more or less as middlemen and instructors in the use of the equipment they provide.

Reactions to Military Assistance Program

Assessments of Chinese counterparts' reactions to MAP were focused on (1) the frequency with which counterparts wished to make changes in the way in which they performed their work and which they,

at least in part, ascribed to having been a participant in the MAP, (2) the degree to which they believed that they had succeeded in effecting these changes, (3) the circumstances they believed to have impeded their efforts to make changes, and (4) the changes that counterparts reported in themselves and their relationships with superiors and subordinates.

First, 79% of the counterparts reported believing that by virtue of participating in the MAP they had been influenced to attempt changes in the ways in which they discharged their duties. Moreover, 94% of the counterparts who attempted changes reported them partially (5%), mostly (78%), or completely (11%) accomplished.

Whereas advisors indicated that differences between the values of advisors and counterparts constituted the most frequently encountered type of obstacle, lack of equipment and supplies was the obstacle mentioned most often by counterparts. Answering a question concerning factors that "have prevented or made it more difficult for you to make the changes you wanted," counterparts considered eight alternatives and ranked those they regarded as applicable (see Table 10).

Table 10
Factors Impeding Changes, as Perceived by Counterparts

Alternative	Mean Rank	Percent Who Ranked Item
Lack of tools and equipment	1.6	50.6
Lack of properly trained personnel	2.4	41.6
Lack of time in which to complete the change	2.6	35.1
Lack of authorization; military regulations do not permit the change	2.8	32.5
Lack of information required to effect the change	3.7	19.5
Lack of authority	4.2	14.3
Superior officer does not approve of the change	5.6	9.1
Lack of acceptance by subordinates	6.8	5.2

A large majority (81%) of the counterparts reported that their work is more interesting than the work in which they were previously engaged. In addition to the satisfaction of preexisting interests, counterparts reported that they have been able to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the men under their control. Only a very small percentage of the counterparts reported the existence of undesirable effects stemming from the MAP (see Table 11).

Counterpart personnel whose subordinates had advisors were asked to rank order statements describing changes that could have occurred in their relations with subordinates through the latter's participation in the MAP. Table 12 summarizes the responses that were obtained to these statements.

While counterparts gave rather similar responses as to the direct effects the MAP had had upon them, there was more variation among their responses as to the effects of the MAP upon their subordinates. Only a very small percentage indicated that the MAP had had

Table 11
Effects of the MAP, as Perceived by Counterparts

Alternative	Mean Rank	Percent Who Ranked Item
I have been able to increase the efficiency and capability of the men under my control.	2.3	76.6
I am more interested in my work.	2.7	80.5
I have been promoted.	2.9	11.7
My superior officer consults me more often for my ideas and opinions.	3.1	66.2
My work has become easier.	3.4	64.9
I have been able to satisfy my interest in the United States and better understand the American people.	4.0	76.6
My superior officer now gives me more authority to make more decisions.	4.0	37.7
I now have higher social status among my colleagues.	4.5	27.3
Participation in the MAP has made no difference.	4.5	10.4
My work has been made more difficult.	4.6	6.5
My income has been increased.	4.6	6.5
I now have more trouble getting along with my superiors.	5.0	3.9
My chances for promotion have been improved.	6.2	13.0

Table 12
Statements Descriptive of MAP-Influenced Changes in Subordinates, as Perceived by Counterparts

Because of my subordinates' participation in the MAP:	Mean Rank	Percent Who Ranked Item
My work has become easier.	1.9	40.3
My subordinate (s) are now more capable and efficient than before.	2.4	42.9
I can now delegate more work to my subordinate(s).	2.6	37.7
I now seek the advice and recommendations of my subordinate (s) more often than before.	3.2	28.6
My unit has received favorable recognition from higher headquarters.	3.6	31.2
My subordinate (s) are more hopeful of being promoted.	5.0	9.1
I have more trouble with subordinate (s) than before.	6.0	1.3
My subordinate (s) have been promoted.	6.7	3.9
My subordinate (s) have probably been able to increase their incomes.	7.5	2.6
My work has become more difficult.	8.0	3.9

undesirable effects upon their subordinates and their relations to them. Rather, counterparts reported that their work was easier because their subordinates were more capable and efficient, and more work could be delegated to them.

Table 13
Degree of Counterparts' Satisfaction with Progress of Their Work
(Percent)

Rating	Problems				
	1 (N = 52)	2 (N = 43)	3 (N = 36)	4 (N = 28)	5 (N = 20)
Extremely Satisfied	23	30	36	21	35
Very Satisfied	48	28	33	39	45
Moderately Satisfied	13	23	22	21	15
Moderately Dissatisfied	8	12	8	14	0
Very Dissatisfied	6	7	0	4	0
Extremely Dissatisfied	2	0	0	0	5
Total "Satisfied" responses	84	81	92	82	95
Total "Dissatisfied" responses	16	19	8	18	5

Satisfaction With Progress

As Table 13 indicates, Chinese counterparts reported slightly greater satisfaction with the progress of their work than did their advisors. Both American advisors and Chinese counterparts, however, reported considerably more satisfaction than dissatisfaction with their progress. In neither group were there significant differences in satisfaction as a function of the degree of importance attached to the problems by advisors or counterparts.

Satisfaction With Advisors

Approximately 90% of the Chinese counterparts expressed positive attitudes toward their American advisor co-workers, regardless of the problem, while most of the remaining responses were neutral (see Table 14). On the other hand, about 75% of the American advisors

Table 14
Counterparts' Attitudes Toward Advisor Co-Workers

Statement	Co-Worker for Problem				
	1 (N = 51)	2 (N = 42)	3 (N = 36)	4 (N = 27)	5 (N = 19)
I would do whatever I could to arrange to be able to work with him in the future.	55	60	58	48	37
I would be moderately disappointed if we were unable to continue to work together.	37	33	36	44	53
I would have neither positive nor negative feelings if we were not able to continue to work together.	6	7	6	7	11
I would be moderately relieved if I knew that I would not work with him in the future.	2	0	0	0	0
I would do whatever I could to arrange it so that I would not have to work with him in the future.	0	0	0	0	0
Percentage Positive	92	93	94	93	89
Percentage Neutral	6	7	6	7	11
Percentage Negative	2	0	0	0	0

expressed positive attitudes toward their Chinese counterparts, regardless of the problem, while most of the remaining responses were neutral (Table 8).

Sources of Information Leading to Action

Comparison of the Chinese counterparts' indications of sources of information leading to action, summarized in Table 15, with those of the American advisors yields the following conclusions:

(1) The Chinese counterparts are more often, and more strongly influenced to work on specific problems by:

- (a) Advisors
- (b) Superior officers

On approximately 80% of the problems, the Chinese counterparts gave advisors as a source leading to action (Americans indicated counterparts as a source on about 30% of the problems). In addition, the Chinese assigned this co-worker source an average rank 1.3 higher than did the Americans.

As for superior officers, the Chinese indicated this source for about 60% of the problems (compared to about 30% for Americans), and assigned this source an average rank 0.6 higher than did the Americans.

(2) The Chinese counterparts are less often, and less strongly, led to work on specific problems by:

- (a) Personal observations
- (b) Taking over the problem from a man transferred elsewhere.

The latter is probably simply a function of the more rapid turnover of advisors. As for personal observations, the Chinese indicated this source on an average of only 46% of the problems (compared to 85% for Americans), and assigned this source an average rank 1.2 lower than did the Americans.

From these findings it may tentatively be concluded that the American advisors tend to operate in a self-reliant fashion rather than depending upon instructions from superiors. The American advisors do not, however, make very much use of their counterparts as sources of information leading to work on specific problems. Whether this is because the counterparts do not volunteer such information as often or because the American advisors are less likely to act upon such information from their counterparts is a question worthy of study.

Channels of Communication

Effecting important changes in the host military organization requires cooperation from, and coordination with, several facets of the organization. Observations of the situation on Taiwan indicated that an advisor seldom succeeds in bringing about change by influencing only his immediate counterpart. For such proposed changes to be successfully implemented, approval must be secured from the counterpart's superior. Consequently, existence of a channel of communication between advisor and counterpart's superior is important as a means of making implementation more feasible.

Table 15
Sources of Information Related to Counterparts' Decisions to Work on Problems

	Most Important Problem (N = 52)		2nd Most Important Problem (N = 43)		3rd Most Important Problem (N = 36)		4th Most Important Problem (N = 28)		5th Most Important Problem (N = 20)		Average	
	Percent	Mean Rank	Percent	Mean Rank	Percent	Mean Rank	Percent	Mean Rank	Percent	Mean Rank	Percent	Mean Rank
1. An advisor brought it to my attention.	87	1.87	89	1.58	78	1.75	64	1.67	85	1.29	81.8	1.7
2. My superior officer brought it to my attention.	65	2.06	68	2.10	58	1.76	46	1.92	55	1.82	60.2	2.0
3. I learned about it by reading an official report.	56	2.90	47	2.65	56	2.60	32	3.33	45	2.56	48.8	2.8
4. I learned about it from a liaison officer.	25	4.46	26	4.27	14	4.40	14	3.50	25	2.60	21.3	4.1
5. A subordinate officer brought it to my attention.	36	3.47	37	2.75	39	3.14	25	3.43	15	2.67	32.8	3.1
6. I learned about the problem from personal observation of the situation.	60	2.61	49	2.86	36	2.62	50	2.71	35	3.14	48.2	2.7
7. It was a problem that I took over from another man who was transferred elsewhere.	10	5.60	9	5.50	8	5.00	7	4.00	10	1.50	8.9	4.7
8. Other source	6	5.33	9	5.25	3	6.00	7	4.50	0	0	6.3	5.3

It is likewise important that a channel of communication exist between the advisor and the counterpart's subordinates, since it is the latter who primarily will be engaged in the actual work of implementing changes. Indifference, lack of information, or hostility to the changes on the part of the subordinates can significantly reduce the chances of success.

Responses to the questionnaire indicate that about half (49%) of the advisors normally have opportunities to communicate directly with the superiors of the counterparts they advise. This means that about half of the advisors can communicate with their counterparts' superiors only indirectly, through their own superiors or through their counterparts. However, almost all of the counterparts (93%) indicated that their superiors had American advisors. Nevertheless, this addition to the chain of communication may lessen precision and attenuate emphasis in communication between advisor and counterpart's superior.

Moreover, 52% of the counterparts indicated that no advisor was assigned to their subordinates. Thus, as many as one-half of the counterpart subordinates who could exert influence upon the fate of a recommendation are apparently not directly accessible to the influence of advisors.

APPENDICES

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Appendix A

MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY QUESTIONNAIRE I

The Human Resources Research Office has been authorized by the Chief of Research and Development, Department of the Army, to conduct an exploratory study of the Military Assistance Program. This questionnaire has been designed to provide you with an opportunity to describe the types of problems that confront you in your present assignment, and the methods and techniques which you have found useful.

In addition, some of your answers will provide the kind of information that is required in order to discover the patterns of influence that exist in your work with the Armed Forces of The Government of the Republic of China.

The objective of this inquiry is to obtain information which may provide a basis for improving the effectiveness of the Military Assistance Program.

Training Methods Division
HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH OFFICE
The George Washington University
under contract with
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

PART A

While it is necessary, for classification purposes, to have the personal identification requested here, you are assured that the information contained in individual questionnaires will be used only for research purposes. It will not be made available to any member of the U.S. or Chinese Armed Forces.

1. Name _____
last first middle initial
2. What is your military rank? (Circle the appropriate designation.)
08 W/O Is this a specialist rating?
07 E9
06 E8 ☐ Yes
05 E7 ☐ No
04 E6
03 E5
02 E4
01 E3
3. What is your age to nearest birthday? _____
4. What is your branch of service? (e.g., Inf., Arty., etc.) _____
5. Give the official title of your present job, your present location, and a brief description of your duties:
Job title _____
Present office address _____
Duties _____

6. Approximately what percentage of your duty time is spent in
%
a. _____ administrative work?
b. _____ advisory work?
c. _____ other? (describe) _____
100% Total
7. How many months have you been assigned to MAAG Taiwan? _____
8. Have you had any MAAG assignments prior to the one you now have?
☐ Yes ☐ No

9. Have you had any similar assignments (not MAAG) prior to the current one, that required you to give technical advice to foreign nationals?

☐ Yes ☐ No

10. For each previous MAAG or similar assignment you have had, fill in the spaces below, beginning with the most recent and supplying all the information requested for each.

a. Country _____

Number of months spent there _____

Type of assignment (check one):

☐ MAAG

☐ Other (specify): _____

Branch of foreign Army to which you gave advice _____

Official duties _____

b. Country _____

Number of months spent there _____

Type of assignment (check one):

☐ MAAG

☐ Other (specify): _____

Branch of foreign Army to which you gave advice _____

Official duties _____

c. Country _____

Number of months spent there _____

Type of assignment (check one):

☐ MAAG

☐ Other (specify): _____

If you have had more than three assignments, use additional sheets of paper to record the information requested.

PART B

12. What is the most important problem on which you have advised a counterpart?

Description of the problem:

- a. Briefly describe the situation as it existed before you gave any advice or made recommendations. If equipment was involved, describe it with official nomenclature.

- b. Tell exactly what you did about this problem, i.e., explain what actions you took or what advice you gave.

- c. What obstacles have made the problem more difficult to solve or slowed down progress on the problem? If cultural differences are involved, be sure to give a specific description of them.

- d. How did you attempt to get around these obstacles or to remove them?

- e. Has the problem been solved? If not solved, what remains to be done?

f. How satisfied are you with the progress that has been made?
Place an X in the one box that is adjacent to the most appropriate answer.

- (1) ☐ Extremely Satisfied
- (2) ☐ Very Satisfied
- (3) ☐ Moderately Satisfied
- (4) ☐ Moderately Dissatisfied
- (5) ☐ Very Dissatisfied
- (6) ☐ Extremely Dissatisfied

g. What sources of information made you decide that this was a problem to which you should devote some time and attention? Read the seven statements that follow and then rank them according to their importance that they had in your reaching a decision to do something about the problem. Place a number 1 on the line adjacent to the most important source of information, a number 2 on the line adjacent to the second most important statement, etc. If an alternative is not appropriate, make no entry.

- (a) _____ A counterpart brought it to my attention.
- (b) _____ My superior officer brought it to my attention.
- (c) _____ I learned about it by reading an official report.
- (d) _____ I learned about it from a liaison officer.
- (e) _____ A subordinate officer brought it to my attention.
- (f) _____ I learned of the problem from personal observation of the situation.
- (g) _____ It was a problem that I took over from another man who was transferred elsewhere.
- (h) _____ Other source (specify): _____

h. How many months and weeks did you work on this problem?

_____ Months _____ Weeks

i. What is the name and rank of the Chinese person with whom you worked most closely on this problem?

name	rank
------	------

j. Place an X before the one statement that best summarizes your feelings about this person.

- (a) ☐ I would do whatever I could to arrange to be able to work with him in the future.
- (b) ☐ I would be moderately disappointed if we were unable to continue to work together.
- (c) ☐ I would have neither positive nor negative feelings if we were not able to continue to work together.
- (d) ☐ I would be moderately relieved if I knew that I would not work with him in the future.
- (e) ☐ I would do whatever I could to arrange it so that I would not have to work with him in the future.

- k. In the spaces below, indicate the number of American and Chinese personnel of each grade, who were (are) involved in this problem, according to the frequency of your meetings with them. If you met with the same personnel each time you had a meeting, list all of them under the "Most frequently met" column and leave the other columns blank.

<u>Most frequently met</u>				<u>Least frequently met</u>			
<u>Chinese</u>		<u>American</u>		<u>Chinese</u>		<u>American</u>	
(a)	_____	08	_____	(a)	_____	C8	_____
(b)	_____	07	_____	(b)	_____	07	_____
(c)	_____	06	_____	(c)	_____	06	_____
(d)	_____	05	_____	(d)	_____	05	_____
(e)	_____	04	_____	(e)	_____	04	_____
(f)	_____	03	_____	(f)	_____	03	_____
(g)	_____	02	_____	(g)	_____	02	_____
(h)	_____	01	_____	(h)	_____	01	_____
(i)	_____	W0	_____	(i)	_____	W0	_____
(j)	_____	E9	_____	(j)	_____	E9	_____
(k)	_____	E8	_____	(k)	_____	E8	_____
(l)	_____	E7	_____	(l)	_____	E7	_____
(m)	_____	E6	_____	(m)	_____	E6	_____
(n)	_____	E5	_____	(n)	_____	E5	_____
(o)	_____	E4	_____	(o)	_____	E4	_____
(p)	_____	E3	_____	(p)	_____	E3	_____

- l. Write on the appropriate line below the number of the one phrase that best describes the frequency with which you met the men shown in each of the columns above:

- | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| (a) _____ Most frequently met | 1. several times daily |
| (b) _____ Least frequently met | 2. about once a day |
| | 3. about once every 2 or 3 days |
| | 4. about once a week |
| | 5. about twice a month |
| | 6. about once a month |
| | 7. less than a month |

- m. In what month and year did you start to work on this problem?
(use numbers for both month and year)

(a) _____ Month (b) _____ Year

- n. Are you currently working on this problem?

(c) ☐ Yes (d) ☐ No

- o. If you no longer work on this problem, when did you stop work?
Give the month and year.

(e) _____ Month (f) _____ Year

- p. If you no longer work on this problem, is someone else in the MAAG now working on it?

(g) ☐ Yes (h) ☐ No

(NOTE: Questions 13, 14, 15, and 16 are identical with Question 12, except that they refer to the "second most important problem," "third most important problem," etc.)

PART C

17. Do you ever have occasion to offer advice and recommendations on an informal basis to members of the Chinese Armed Forces to whom you have no official obligations or responsibilities?

☐ Yes ☐ No

If yes, estimate the number of Chinese personnel whom you have informally advised during the last month. _____

18. What was the average number of contacts that you had with these personnel during the last month? (Put an X in box next to the one most appropriate answer.)

- 1. ☐ several times daily
- 2. ☐ about once a day
- 3. ☐ about two or three times a week
- 4. ☐ about once a week
- 5. ☐ about twice a month
- 6. ☐ about once a month

19. This question is concerned with determining the conditions under which you have become aware of the problems on which you informally gave advice to the group of personnel in the preceding two questions.

What percentage of the problems on which you informally gave advice come to you

%

- a. _____ without being referred by anyone?
- b. _____ by way of another member of the MAAG?
- c. _____ by way of a referral from a member of the Chinese Armed Forces who already knew you?
- d. _____ because your official job title indicated that you would be able to give advice?
- e. _____ through your own efforts in seeking problems?
- f. _____ other (specify) _____

100% Total

PART D

The following questions concern nonduty social contacts that you may have had with one or more members of the Chinese Armed Forces, their families and friends. For the purpose of this questionnaire, a social function refers to gatherings of one or more Americans and Chinese who engage in conversation while eating, drinking, sight-seeing or participating in cultural and recreational activities.

20. During the last month:

- a. ____ How many invitations did you receive from members of the Chinese Armed Forces to be their guest at a social function?
- b. ____ How many invitations did you accept?
- c. ____ How many people do you estimate that you had conversations with at these functions?

21. During the last month:

- a. ____ How many invitations did you receive from Chinese civilians to be their guest at a social function?
- b. ____ How many invitations did you accept?
- c. ____ How many people do you estimate that you had conversations with at these functions?

22. During the last month, how many members of the Chinese Armed Forces, their families and friends have been your guests at social functions? _____

23. Do you currently engage in any more-or-less regularly scheduled social or recreational activities with one or more members of the Chinese Armed Forces, their families and friends?

☐ Yes ☐ No

If yes, how often do these contacts usually occur?

- | | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> daily | 3. <input type="checkbox"/> bimonthly |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> weekly | 4. <input type="checkbox"/> once a month or less |

24. Do you employ Chinese or Taiwanese personnel in your household?

☐ Yes ☐ No

25. Briefly describe any other circumstances under which you have opportunities to become personally acquainted with Chinese military or civilian personnel and the frequency of these contacts.

Appendix B

CHINESE OFFICER QUESTIONNAIRE

**TRANSLATION COPY: ORDER (51) HSIN CHIA #195 BY GHQ
ARMY - CFY51, SEPTEMBER, 10**

**SUBJECT: Filling Out The Investigative Questionnaires by
Chinese Officers**

Request completion of the questionnaires by Chinese officers, pertaining to the processing of various problems, training methods and techniques in the Military Assistance Program, by Dr. Froehlich, the specialist of the Human Resources Research Office (HumRRO) of the George Washington University, Washington D.C., who is conducting an Exploratory HumRRO Study on Taiwan. It is therefore essential that the questionnaires have been completed and returned to them at the address given within four days after they are received.

/s/ Liu An-chi
/t/ LIU AN-CHI
General, CA
Commander-in-Chief, GHQ Army

Check by: Chang, Chih-shan

TRANSLATION COPY

CHINESE OFFICER QUESTIONNAIRE

PART I

1. Name: _____
2. (Military) Rank: _____
3. Age: _____
4. Branch of Service (e.g., Arty., Inf., etc.): _____
5. Give the official title of your present job, your office location and a brief description of your duties.
 Title: _____
 Office location (as name of city, town, or base): _____
 Duties: _____

6. Approximately what percentage of your duty time is spent in:

	<u>% of time spent</u>
(a) administrative duties	_____ %
(b) meeting with MAAG advisers	_____ %
(c) training troops	_____ %
(d) other duties. Please describe	_____ %

Check total. It
must add to 100%

- 6A. Have you ever studied at an American school? Please put X in the appropriate box.

☐ Yes ☐ No

If you have studied at one or more American schools, please write the school names and the period of time you have been there.

	<u>School Name</u>	<u>Time of Arrival</u>		<u>Time of Departure</u>	
		<u>Month</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Month</u>	<u>Year</u>
1.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
2.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
3.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
4.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

7. Since you first received advice from the U.S. MAAG, how long it has been up to now? Please write the time according to the months. As 2 years, 3 months, it is 27 months.

Months: _____

8. How many U.S. advisors have you worked with before the present one(s)? _____.
9. Do you now have an officially designated American advisor(s) who works with you?
- ☐ Yes ☐ No

PART II

10. How often does your superior officer have contact with members of the Military Assistance Advisory Group? Encircle the one most appropriate alternative.
1. several times a day.
 2. about once a day.
 3. about once every two or three days.
 4. about once per week.
 5. about twice a month.
 6. about once a month.
 7. less than once a month.
 8. never.
11. Does your superior officer have one or more advisory counterparts in the Military Assistance Advisory Group?
- ☐ Yes ☐ No
12. How well does your superior officer know your counterpart (or counterparts if you have more than one) in the Military Assistance Advisory Group? Circle the one most appropriate alternative.
1. He knows the counterpart(s) as well as I do.
 2. He knows the counterpart(s) moderately well.
 3. He knows the counterpart(s) hardly at all.
 4. He doesn't know the counterpart(s).

13. Below are listed a number of consequences that may occur as a result of having participated in the Military Assistance Program. First, read all of the statements and rank them in terms of how true each of them is for you. There are 13 statements. Assign the number 1 to the statement that is most true to you, number 2 for the next most true, etc. Be sure to rank all of the statements that are true of you and make no entry beside those that are not true to you. Because of my experience with the MAAG:

- _____ (a) I am more eligible for a promotion in rank.
- _____ (b) I have received a promotion.
- _____ (c) my superior officer now permits me to make more decisions without having to get his permission first.
- _____ (d) I have higher social status among those officers who have not had MAP experience.
- _____ (e) my job has become more interesting to me.
- _____ (f) my superior officer more often calls upon me for information, advice, and suggestions.
- _____ (g) I have been able to increase the effectiveness and capability of my troops.
- _____ (h) my job has become more difficult.
- _____ (i) my job has become easier.
- _____ (j) I have been able to satisfy my interest in learning about the United States and Americans.
- _____ (k) I have been able to increase my income.
- _____ (l) I have had more problems with my superior officers than I formerly had.
- _____ (m) my experiences with MAP have not made any difference to me.

14. Have your experiences with the MAAG led you to want to make changes in your own work or the work of your subordinates?

☐ Yes ☐ No

15. If you answered "YES" to question 14, how many of the changes that you wanted to make have you been able to make?

- 1. all of them
- 2. most of them
- 3. few of them
- 4. none of them

16. If you have not been able to make all the changes that you wanted to make, rank the following statements in terms of how true each of them is for you. Assign the number 1 to the statement that is most true, the number 2 to the next most true, etc. Make no entry beside those that are not true for you.

- _____ (a) My superior officer would not permit the change to be made.
- _____ (b) The necessary equipment was not available.
- _____ (c) There has not yet been enough time in which to make the change.
- _____ (d) Official military regulations prohibit the change.
- _____ (e) There is not a sufficient number of properly trained men available to make the change possible.
- _____ (f) I have not been able to get all of the information required to make the change.
- _____ (g) My subordinates would not like the change.
- _____ (h) I do not have the authority to make the change.

17. Do you have any subordinates who have one or more advisors in the MAAG?

☐ Yes ☐ No

18. If you answered "YES" to question 17, rank the following statements in terms of how true they are. Assign the number 1 to the statement that is most true, the number 2 to the second most true statement, etc. Make no entry beside any statement that is untrue of you. Because of my subordinate's work with the MAAG:

- _____ (a) My job has been made more difficult.
- _____ (b) My job has been made easier.
- _____ (c) He is more likely to receive a promotion.
- _____ (d) He has received a promotion.
- _____ (e) I am now able to delegate more work to him than was possible prior to the experience he gained from the MAAG.
- _____ (f) I rely more heavily upon him for information, advice, and suggestions than before.
- _____ (g) The men under my command are more effective and capable.
- _____ (h) I have had more problems working with him.
- _____ (i) My unit has received more favorable recognition from higher headquarters.
- _____ (j) He has probably been able to increase his income.

PART III

19. What advice have you (you honorable officer) received from the American advisor with respect to the most important problem? Describe this problem:

- (1) Briefly describe the situation as it existed before you received any advice or recommendations from the MAAG. If equipment was involved, describe it with formal nomenclature.

- (2) Briefly describe the advice or recommendations you received with respect to the problem and also the revisions you put in for resolving this problem.

- (3) What elements (obstacles) made it more difficult to solve or slow to proceed of this problem? What cause made it more difficult or impossible for you (you honorable officer) to make full use of the advice and recommendations that were given to you? If the difference of civilization is involved, please give example and explain it.

- (4) How did you (you honorable officer) attempt to get around these obstacles or to overcome them?

- (5) Were you satisfied about the progress with respect to this problem? Please write "V" in the box beside the one most appropriate alternative.

- (a) ☐ Most satisfied.
(b) ☐ Very satisfied.
(c) ☐ Satisfied.
(d) ☐ Unsatisfied.
(e) ☐ Very unsatisfied.
(f) ☐ Most unsatisfied.

(6) From what source of material did you decide you should devote much time and attention to solve this problem? Please read the following 7 statements. Assign the number 1 to the statement of source that is the most important, the number 2 that is the second most important source, etc. If the statement of source is not appropriate, do not assign the number.

- (a) ___ Suggested by the American advisor(s).
- (b) ___ Suggested by the superior officers.
- (c) ___ Obtained from reading the formal reports.
- (d) ___ Obtained from the liaison officer.
- (e) ___ Suggested by the subordinate.
- (f) ___ Obtained from observing the existing situation by me.
- (g) ___ Obtained from the ex-officer.
- (h) ___ Other sources. Please describe.

(i) What were the name and rank of the American advisor who had worked closely with you (you honorable officer) on this problem?

Name	Rank
------	------

(j) What is the most possible feeling do you (you honorable officer) have of that member (advisor) for working and cooperating with him? Write "V" in the box beside the one most possible feeling that you have.

- (1) ☐ I want to do all my best to arrange and work with him during the future.
- (2) ☐ If I am not able to work with him, I feel somewhat regrettable.
- (3) ☐ If I am not able to work with him during the future, I feel nothing regrettable.
- (4) ☐ If I do not work with him again during the future, I feel happy.
- (5) ☐ I want to try and arrange all the possibilities not working with him any more during the future.

(NOTE: Questions 20, 21, 22, and 23 are identical with Question 19, except that they refer to the "second most important problem," "third most important problem," etc.)

Appendix C

DEFINITIONS OF CONTENT CODING CLASSES

In addition to the actual definitions of each of the 12 content coding classes, examples of responses that were so coded are presented at the end of each definition to give a better idea of what is meant by the class name and definition.

I. MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR

Where equipment is not operating at a required level because personnel do not properly carry out directives and procedures related to maintenance and repair.

A. Use of tools and shop facilities for maintenance: Where tools are improperly used, the wrong tool is used, maintenance aids (check sheets and manuals) are improperly used, and where shop facilities, though basically adequate, are not maintained or are disorderly.

B. Specific items for which maintenance is inadequate: Where it is possible to specify a given item of equipment that is not being maintained at a specific level, or is in a state of disrepair. Maintenance of other facilities and areas is included here.

Sample Responses:

The unsatisfactory condition of engineer equipment.

The maintenance section would receive a report of a trouble. They would then go to the section without tools, manual or men to help. They would then have to send men from the section back to the assembly building for tools and manuals as they needed them.

II. OPERATION AND USE OF EQUIPMENT

Where equipment is not being properly utilized, and the result may be chance of injury to operator or equipment, as well as inefficient and ineffective use of the equipment. Where the operating proficiency of a team or individual is low. This class does not include misuse through neglect or failure to employ proper maintenance, and it does not include failure to use maintenance tools properly.

Sample Responses:

Throughout the Chinese Army all radio and test equipment were off frequency or out of alignment. When

equipment was repaired and sent back to the field,
equipment was still out of alignment.

Inability to adequately mass artillery fires.

III. SUPPLY

Where problems including imbalance and absence of supplies arise with regard to equipment and physical facilities, including tools required for maintenance and aids needed for training, because personnel do not follow directives and procedures properly. References to lack of funds that are not accompanied by an explanation for the reason funds are low are included here.

Record Keeping: Where supply problems are rather specifically a function of failures to adhere to record keeping procedures and systems related to inventories, material and work assignments. When the problem of excess arises because of faulty record keeping which leads to unplanned accumulations rather than deliberate hoarding, it will be included here.

Sample Responses:

Lack of mobility of counterattacking force due to shortage of vehicles to transport signal equipment, ammunition and heavy weapons.

Faulty and incorrect records and reports.

IV. TRAINING

Where problems arise in on-going training procedures and exercises because modification of training methods, aids and materials, or evaluation methods is needed. Problems that arise because of an ignorance of better training methods rather than deficient policies regarding training procedures and organization of personnel in training are included here.

Sample Responses:

Problem: To teach aircraft mechanics for future higher levels of maintenance.

During Platoon Tests at Hakou by armored infantry and tank battalions, inadequate aggressor play to make the problems realistic was observed.

V. BETWEEN COUNTRIES AGREEMENTS

A. Where the host military organization makes requests for which there may be no authorization in MAP. Requests for men, money and material which are improperly submitted or which indicate that the counterpart is not acquainted with what can be or is authorized are included here.

B. Where problems arise because proper programing is not carried out and programing procedures are not followed.

C. Where violations of agreements are evident, or host military organization fails to carry out some part of agreements. Attempts to utilize MAP resources for unauthorized purposes are included here.

Sample Responses:

The Chinese Army had formally requested U.S. support for an elaborate engineering college to be known as the Army Institute of Technology . . . (which) the Chinese Army does not really need.

Problem: To explain that when funds for balance of prior fiscal year were not requisitioned against then they were recouped by D.D. and that we did not owe the Chinese Army the balance.

VI. COMMUNICATION COORDINATION

Where communication becomes difficult because of many groups to be coordinated, a refusal to attempt communication, the transmission of incomplete or inadequate information, or the absence of media or situations essential for communication. Problems resulting from the lack of shared language are not coded here. Problems related to the operation, maintenance of equipment and policies governing physical communication system are not included here.

Sample Responses:

No ready reference existed at Taiwan ordnance parts manufacturing shop which would clearly show the manufacturing capabilities; therefore various agencies on Taiwan which might have need of this capability were unable to avail themselves of it.

VII. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

Where there is fairly clear evidence that the problem arises because of an absence of policies, procedures, and directives or because such policies are poor and inadequate as judged by fairly objective standards (including counterpart agreement) it will be included in the following categories.

A. Organization of Personnel: Where policies to guide the distribution and scheduling of functions of subordinate personnel, as well as policies concerning distribution of personnel by rank and/or mission are missing or judged objectively inadequate. Shortages of personnel (including trained personnel) as well as problems that arise from attempts to effect reorganization of work groups or establishment of new ones are included here.

B. Policies Concerning Equipment: Where policies concerning the acquisition, distribution, maintenance, and operation of equipment are

missing or objectively judged inadequate. Problems that arise from reallocation of equipment because of lack of policy or procedure are included here.

Disposal: Where there is failure to establish policies and issue directives concerning the proper disposal of excess salvage material and equipment. Indications of a deliberate attempt to avoid issuing such policies are included here.

C. Enforcement and Inspections: Where there is failure at a command level to follow up or enforce directives concerning personnel and equipment. Where there is failure to conduct adequate inspections, or failure at a command level to enforce or carry out policy.

D. Training: Where training problems arise primarily from a lack of policy or policy that is objectively judged undesirable. Where policies concerning distribution of personnel in training programs and distribution of training equipment and supplies are considered inadequate.

Where inadequate policy and procedures make establishment of new training programs or extensive modification of on-going programs necessary.

Sample Responses:

Promotion of non-nurses to nursing officers; seniority is by rank which means that leadership positions are occupied by non-nurses.

Training schedules were often followed haphazardly as to time, subject, and place. Makeup classes were seldom conducted. Changes were frequent and issued with little or no prior notice.

Develop a Troop Program. Reorganize Chinese Army to include etc.

Command was using out-dated counterattack plans which was due to less than a thorough analysis of the situation.

VIII. MAAG

A. Where problems arise from absence of a consistent and agreed upon set of policy objectives and means among advisors, including differences between past and present advisors.

B. Where advisors lack the knowledge, information and/or technical skills they need.

Sample Responses:

Lack of knowledge on type of unit - i.e., lack of knowledge of U.S. advisors about Psychological War units in general.

The hardest obstacle to overcome was to get approval from the Trans. Adv. Div. (my co-workers) (NOTE: co-workers here refers to fellow advisors.)

IX. DIFFERENCES IN WHAT IS VALUED

Where counterpart and advisor differ with respect to what is considered valuable and important, and what standards of excellence should be expected.

A. Failure to Follow Suggestion: Where problems or obstacles arise because counterparts do not readily adopt into practice the methods and procedures that advisors recommend.

B. Minimal Involvement: Where personnel do not attempt to perform work expected of them, do not initiate action, avoid undertaking tasks, and where morale is low, and the advisor perceives an attitude of indifference at any level of command or subordination.

C. Differences about Policy: Where the problem arises because of different views held by counterpart and advisor with regard to policy. Objective standards are not apparent, but advisor believes policy is inadequate or undesirable.

Sample Responses:

The old Chinese concept of employing only a certain amount of artillery fire for a particular operation. Some of the high ranking officers still adhered to this concept.

Non-coms in key supply positions not reporting to work daily and having an indifferent attitude towards their jobs.

X. LANGUAGE

Sample Response:

Language barrier (NOTE: This phrase was widely used.)

XI. DO NOT KNOW (i.e., coder is unable to code response)

Sample Responses:

Deficiency in Tank-Infantry-Artillery Combined Arms Team employment. Tanks, in general, improperly employed.

Spasmodic news stories on unobligated MAP funds.

XII. WEATHER CONDITIONS

Difficulties that arise where little human control or prevention is possible.

Sample Responses:

Obstacle: Humidity and rain.

High humidity, typhoons, and salt water spray from ocean caused corrosion and rust on outside and inside of missiles and radars.

Unclassified
Security Classification

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13. ABSTRACT As part of an Exploratory Study to obtain information on human factors training problems in the Military Assistance Program, a questionnaire was sent to 115 advisors and 115 counterparts in one country (Republic of China), asking about the most important problems they have encountered, obstacles to solution of these problems, sources of information that led to action on the problems, and degree of satisfaction with progress. Questionnaires were returned by 77 advisors and 77 counterparts. Advisors reported that their most important problems were in the areas of command responsibility, maintenance, and supply, and the commonest obstacle to solution of problems was the difference in values between themselves and their counterparts. Counterpart statements about problems and obstacles most often dealt with shortages of equipment and supplies. In general, advisors indicated more satisfaction than dissatisfaction with their progress. Counter- parts expressed slightly more satisfaction with progress than advisors did. Personal observation constituted the primary source of information leading advisors to attempt changes, while counterparts were influenced in this respect by their advisors and their superior officers.		

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14. KEY WORDS	LINK A		LINK B		LINK C	
	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT
Training Military Assistance Program, Republic of China Advisors Counterparts Human Factors Value Differences Change Attempts Military Assistance Advisory Duties						
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